Amaze Holdings, Inc. — financial distress indicators
Financial-health summary
Amaze Holdings, Inc.'s reported numbers place it in the 'Very weak' financial-health band (distress score 78/100). The main indicators are market-implied default probability >20%, severe working-capital shortfall and losses in each of the last 3 years. Independently, the Ohlson accounting model puts its 1-year failure probability at 100% and the market-implied (Merton) default probability is 95.3%. In its favour: revenue still growing (+558% yoy).
Stress by dimension
Share price — last 12 months
Indicators behind the score
Each red flag shows the evidence from the company’s own filings and the financial or legal principle behind it. Points add to the 0–100 score.
Merton distance-to-default -1.67 σ → PD 95%.
Structural (Merton/KMV) model: equity is a call option on assets; low distance-to-default means assets are close to the default point.
Current ratio is 0.09 (current assets cover 9% of near-term obligations).
Cash-flow insolvency test: inability to pay debts as they fall due is the trigger for both U.S. involuntary petitions and Indian IBC default.
Net income negative in 3 of 3 fiscal years.
Persistent losses erode equity and the capacity to absorb shocks.
Operating cash flow negative in 3 of the last 3 years.
A business that cannot fund itself from operations depends on external capital to survive.
Price is -100% from its 52-week high.
Equity markets price distress early; collapses of this size usually reflect fear of wipe-out in a restructuring.
O-score 10.89 → model probability 100%.
Ohlson (1980) logit model of 1-year corporate failure; O > 0 (p > 50%) is the original failure cut-off.
Last price $0.02.
Below the $1 minimum-bid listing standard (Nasdaq Rule 5550(a)(2) / NYSE 802.01C); sustained breach leads to delisting and loss of capital-market access.
Operating margin fell from -581% to -2765% in two years.
Sharp margin compression signals loss of pricing power or cost control.
1 severe and 0 moderate distress-related headlines in the last 6 months.
Headlines are corroborating evidence only; they are weighted lightly and never drive a flag alone.
Revenue vs net income
Cash generation
Debt vs cash vs equity
✅ Mitigating factors
- Revenue still growing (+558% YoY).
📰 Recent news scan
- delistNYSE American to Commence Delisting Proceedings Against Amaze Holdings, Inc. (AMZE)Yahoo Finance · 2026-09-29
- Amaze Turns to Gold and Defi With $155 Million BullionFx Reverse Acquisition OfferYahoo Finance · 2026-09-29
- Amaze Holdings Signs $155M Deal for Gold-Backed DeFi Platform AlchemyYahoo Finance · 2026-09-29
- Amaze Holdings and C2 Establish Revenue Referral PartnershipYahoo Finance · 2026-09-16
- Amaze Holdings Announces Cost Reduction Plan Targeting Approximately 40% Reduction in Operating ExpensesYahoo Finance · 2026-08-26
- Amaze Holdings Enters Letter of Intent for Strategic Investment in Live Social Creator Platform C2Yahoo Finance · 2026-08-20
⚖️ U.S. legal pathway — Title 11, U.S. Code
Which chapter would apply?
- Chapter 11 — reorganisation. Management usually stays in control as debtor-in-possession; the automatic stay (§362) halts collection; a plan must meet the best-interests test (§1129(a)(7)) and the absolute priority rule (§1129(b)) — creditors are paid before shareholders, who are frequently wiped out.
- Chapter 7 — liquidation. A trustee sells assets and distributes proceeds by statutory priority (§§507, 726).
- Subchapter V (“Chapter 5”) is a fast track for small-business debtors under a statutory debt cap, but SEC-reporting companies are excluded (§101(51D)) — so it rarely applies to listed companies.
What typically triggers a filing
- Payment default or covenant breach lenders will not waive; a debt maturity that cannot be refinanced.
- Auditor going-concern doubt (ASC 205-40 / PCAOB AS 2415) — often itself a default trigger in loan agreements.
- Creditors can force a case with an involuntary petition (§303) if debts are not paid as they come due.
- Delisting after sustained sub-$1 prices or equity deficits cuts off equity funding.
Transactions shortly before filing can be clawed back (preferences — 90 days, §547; fraudulent transfers — 2 years, §548).
Frequently asked questions
What do Amaze Holdings, Inc.'s financial-health indicators show?
As of 2026-10-08, Amaze Holdings, Inc.'s public financial data places it in the 'Very weak' band with a distress score of 78/100, driven by market-implied default probability >20%, severe working-capital shortfall and losses in each of the last 3 years. This is a statistical screen of reported numbers — it does not mean the company is insolvent, has defaulted or will enter insolvency proceedings.
What is Amaze Holdings, Inc.'s financial distress score?
78/100 ('Very weak'). Ohlson O-score 10.89 (model 1-year failure probability 100%). Merton distance-to-default -1.67 σ (model default probability 95.3%).
What works in Amaze Holdings, Inc.'s favour?
Revenue still growing (+558% YoY).
How are shareholders treated if a company enters insolvency?
In a Chapter 11 reorganisation the absolute priority rule pays secured lenders, then unsecured creditors, before shareholders — so existing shares are usually cancelled or heavily diluted. In Chapter 7 the company is liquidated and shareholders rarely recover anything.
Other IT & Software companies with distress indicators
- Cyabra, Inc. (CYAB)Very weak 100/100
- Exyn Technologies, Inc. (EXYN)Very weak 100/100
- The OLB Group, Inc. (OLB)Very weak 100/100
- Roadzen, Inc. (RDZN)Very weak 100/100
- Rekor Systems, Inc. (REKR)Very weak 100/100
- Veea Inc. (VEEA)Very weak 100/100
Methodology
Score = capped sum of rule-based red flags across seven dimensions (liquidity, solvency, profitability, cash flow, sales trend, market signal, news). Ohlson O-score (1980) gives an accounting-based 1-year failure probability; Merton distance-to-default (Bharath & Shumway 2008) gives a market-implied probability. Financial institutions use a capital-based rule set. Recalculated every trading day from the latest filings, prices and news.